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Abstract 
This paper is to address the in-flight reliability of a liquid propulsion engine system for a 
launch vehicle. We first establish a comprehensive list of system and sub-system reliability 
drivers for any liquid propulsion engine system. We then build a reliability model to 
parametrically analyze the impact of some reliability parameters. We present sensitivity 
analysis results for a selected subset of the key reliability drivers using the model. Reliability 
drivers identified include: number of engines for the liquid propulsion stage, single engine 
total reliability, engine operation duration, engine thrust size, reusability, engine de-rating 
o r  up-rating, engine-out design (including engine-out switching reliability, catastrophic 
fraction, preventable failure fraction, unnecessary shutdown fraction), propellant specific 
hazards, engine start and cutoff transient hazards, engine combustion cycles, vehicle and 
engine interface and interaction hazards, engine health management system, engine 
modification, engine ground start hold down with launch commit criteria, engine altitude 
start (1" start), Multiple altitude restart (> 1 restart), component, subsystem and system 
design, manufacturing/ground operation support/pre and post flight check outs and 
inspection, extensiveness of the development program. We present some sensitivity analysis 
results for the following subset of the drivers: number of engines for the propulsion stage, 
single engine total reliability, engine operation duration, engine de-rating o r  up-rating 
requirements, engine-out design, catastrophic fraction, preventable failure fraction, 
unnecessary shutdown fraction, and engine health management system implementation 
(basic redlines and more advanced health management systems). 
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Nomenclature 
Single engine total reliability 
Engine cluster system reliability. X is a subscript to denote the system reliability formula evolvement 
Number of engines in the propulsion stage 
Catastrophic failure fraction 
Preventable failure fraction 
Unnecessary shutdown fraction 
Survivable failure fraction 
Erroneous shutdown fraction 
Health Management System 
Mean Times between failures 
W ith-engine-out 
Without-engine-out 
I. Introduction 
eliability has been one of the most important launch vehicle design parameters. NASA's new space 
R e x p l o r  ation activities, such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and the Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle 
(SDLV), have given great attention to the reliability of new vehicle designs. The industry SDLV consortium team 
has intensively assessed reliability trades in the early stages of its conceptual configuration design and trade study 
activities. A liquid propulsion rocket engine, as one of the leading candidates for launch vehicle propulsion systems, 
is at the forefront of addressing the need to effectively improve reliability starting from the early conceptual design 
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phase. We start the paper by identifying a comprehensive list of reliability drivers at liquid rocket engine system 
and sub-system levels. We then briefly discuss each driver, the reliability implication of it, and the inter- 
relationships among the drivers. We would like to point out that we don’t plan to elaborate details of each driver in 
this paper, considering each driver itself may deserve a focused discussion and a devoted technical paper. Our 
intention of this paper is to bring reliability awareness to all interested parties, collaboratively address reliability 
issues with government and industry partners, and implement design-for-reliability approaches starting from early 
design stages with an objective of significantly improving future launch vehicle reliability. We present a parametric 
reliability model and some sensitivity analysis results to illustrate the impact of some of the drivers on engine 
system reliability. 
11. Reliability Drivers 
We have listed the reliability drivers in the abstract of this paper. The list is based on launch vehicle failure 
history, a literature search, authors’ experiences, and formal and informal communications among industry 
companies and customers. We will briefly discuss the drivers one-by-one in this section. 
Number of liquid Propellant enpines for the m-opulsion stape -- One would think it is trivial to discuss this. Is it 
? Can we answer the questions “is a propulsion system with less engines better than a system with more engines?” 
“How about thrust size of the engine?” “Why don’t we design a stage with a single engine providing all thrust 
needed ?” “Is a bigger engine less reliable than a smaller engine?” The answer depends on the detailed design, 
application needs and physical constraints. Total thrust size, total 
impulse, engine-out design, reliability of the engine itself, catastrophic fraction, and the unnecessary shutdown 
fraction are some of them. Vehicle propulsion power needs will determine the total thrust and impulse allocated to 
all engines. Engine-out design, reliability of the engine itself, catastrophic fraction and unnecessary shutdown 
fraction will decide a single engine or multiple engine propulsion system from a reliability perspective. Our 
quantitative reliability model presented later will parametrically address the impact of the number of engines and 
several other related reliability drivers. 
Several factors affect the design selection. 
Single engine total reliability -- Total engine reliability (RT) is the product of the engine catastrophic reliability 
(&) and the benign shutdown reliability (RB). Both & and RB are determined not only by the inherent engine 
design, manufacturing and operation induced root causes but also by the effectiveness of the health management 
system. Health management system implementation often considers the trades between all these parameters, 
especially if engine-out design is pursued. 
Engine operation duration -- It is intuitive that the longer the engine runs, the lower the engine reliability. 
However, sometimes trades need to be considered for a longer engine running duration with smaller thrust or vice 
versus. Now the question is how to calculate the engine reliability with different run durations for different 
applications for the same engine. Is a 200 second running duration application twice as reliable as a 400 second 
application? The parametric model we present later will introduce a time adjustment equation and show some 
sensitivity results. 
Engine thrust size -- To certain extent, an engine design can be scaled up or down to accommodate different thrust 
requirements. But we have recognized that many design parameters are not linearly scaleable due to complex 
physical relationships. Some threshold values may also exist for certain design features such that totally different 
design or manufacturing methods may apply resulting in a different reliability. One example is casting versus 
forging because of the size limitation of a part. Another example is turbopump turbine blade design, with damping 
or without, driven by the size of the engine. We have noticed that the correlation of engine reliability with its thrust 
size has not been systematically studied. There is probably no conclusive correlation if we consider just size vs. 
reliability though it is often assumed that the smaller the engine, the higher the reliability. 
Reusability -- If we compare a reusable engine with an expendable engine, we will see several factors leading to 
different design considerations. Life requirements for a reusable engine usually are more stringent. As a result, it is 
more challenging to address fatigue related failure modes and causes. Reusable engines also go through post flight 
check out and between-flights maintenance activities. Pro of this is that the post flight inspections and between- 
flight maintenances can reveal hardware problems that can be addressed to hrther improve engine reliability that is 
not possible for expendable engines. A con is potential adverse effect due to human and process errors that impact 
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next flight reliability. We have noticed there is an inclination in liquid engine industry to favor more on expendable 
engine designs than on reusable engines. A detailed study yet needs to be conduct to address commonality and 
uniqueness of reliability for reusable engines and expendable engines. 
De-rating or up-rating -- De-rating is a reliability improvement method that is popularly used in electronics 
industry to enhance reliability. The basic approach of the de-rating is to design a component at a more severe 
environment than its nominal operation environment. The application of de-rating has been one of the hot topics in 
liquid propulsion engine design. The question is can we design an engine with 500klb thrust but just employ the 
engine for a 400klb thrust application for de-rating reliability benefit. The historical data has indicated that about 
90% of failure modes and causes are power level related which is correlated to thrust directly. So it appears that a 
lower power operation will reduce the failure probability. However, other failure modes particularly in 
turbomachinery are sensitive to natural frequencies, and operation at a lower power level may be more detrimental. 
Thus any de-rating approach must be on a case by case basis for each required thrust level. Another aspect is to 
increase the thrust to more than the nominal engine thrust level. An example is the potential operation of the Space 
Shuttle Main Engines at a higher thrust (106 to 109%) in an abort scenario if one engine is shutdown to prevent 
catastrophic failure. result in? Engine de-rating operation is also 
necessary for engine-out design since when one engine fails in a contained manner (engine-out), the rest of engines 
may need to increase their power in order to complete the mission. Therefore all engines, under nominal mission 
operation, have to be de-rated to a percentage of full power level. 
How much reliability degradation does it 
Enpine-out design -- We have touched on the topic several times in the above discussions. Engine-out design is a 
unique design feature for liquid propulsion engines. It is defined as the capability to permit the surviving engines to 
continue to operate when one or more engines fail in a contained manner. The mission can be accomplished by 
elevating the power level or extending the duration of the remaining engines. The mission may also be aborted but 
the vehicle is saved by the continuing operation of the surviving engines at some required power level. The trade off 
of an engine-out design is the extra mass of the engine and propulsion system that leads to a vehicle performance 
penalty. Reliability impact of engine-out design will be explored in more detail in our parametric reliability model 
presented later. 
Engine-out switching reliabilitv -- One of the most important reliability drivers for engine-out design is engine-out 
switching reliability. When the engine system encounters a benign shutdown of one or more engines, the system is 
in a significant transient. Valves open and close, power levels go up and down, and the propellant feed system and 
vehicle control system try to accommodate the unexpected conditions and save the mission and the vehicle. It is 
also an engine and vehicle integration design issue. We see the industry hasn’t accumulated much experience and it 
is very much a challenge to design and validate the system to accommodate all of the contingency situations 
reliably. 
Catastrophic fraction (C,) -- We have defined Cf as the percentage of total engine failures (summation of contained 
and uncontained failures) that result in an engine uncontained failure and loss of vehicle. We denote F, as the 
probability of engine uncontained failures and Fc as the probability of engine contained failures. Then Cf = 
F,/(F,+F,). Lower engine Cf provides a better opportunity for engine-out design to enhance system reliability. 
Historical Apollo and Space Shuttle liquid mgine data hare inilizatd Cf falls into the range of 20% to 40%. Several 
factors that affect the Cf are inherent design characteristics of the engine, effectiveness of health management 
system, and vehicle tolerance on an engine failure. Our parametric reliability model will present some sensitivity 
results for a range of Cfvalues. 
Preventable failure fraction (P,) -- We define Pf as the portion of the engine failures that would be catastrophic if 
the health management system had not caught and shut down the engine. The root causes of Pf are due to the 
inherent design characteristics. This type of failures is usually slow propagation failure events. The advancement of 
HMS development and effectiveness of HMS implementation can potentially mitigate some used-to-be catastrophic 
failures to benign shutdowns. 
Unnecessary shutdown fraction (U,) -- Uf consists of two portions: erroneous engine shutdown fraction (Ef) and 
survivable engine shutdown fraction (Sf). An erroneous engine shutdown is defined as an engine shutdown due to 
engine instrumentation failures while the engine operates nominally. A survivable engine shutdown is defined as an 
engine malfunction the engine can tolerate but that triggers HMS to shutdown the engine. The root causes of 
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survivable failures are due to the inherent engine design. Cf, Pf, and Uf add up to 1. Cf, Pf, and Uf are key 
parameters that support an engine-out design trade study. Our parametric reliability model will address these trades 
in detail. 
Propellant specific hazards -- Liquid propellant choices can affect reliability. Each propellant has its own design 
characteristics, challenges and specific hazards. Examples are hydrogen embrittlement, and material compatibility 
with liquid or gaseous oxygen. Design solutions that mitigate and control specific hazards of certain propellant may 
adversely affect reliability of the engine. 
Engine start and cutoff transient hazards -- Engine start and cut off transients impose some unique design 
challenges. During the transient periods, valves are opening and closing, and the engine controller and health 
management system closely monitor and act on many engine operating parameters. Some unique hazards and 
failure modes can occur, such as damage due to nozzle start transient side loads, and cut off pops from main injector 
and pre-burner propellant backflow. There is a surmise that an engine is more likely to fail during a transient period 
than in a steady state. One extreme view is that all engine failures are transient driven. But another view is that as 
long as transient engine operation is well designed and validated through a development program, the failure rate 
during a transient is no different fiom a steady state period. Both views lead to a conclusion that transient design and 
corresponding failure modes and hazards have to be treated seriously and systematically. 
Engine combustion cvcles -- The various pump-fed rocket engine cycles, differentiated by the method used to drive 
the turbopumps, have an influence on the inherent reliability of the engine. Typical versions have included 1)  the 
most popular and earliest gas generator cycle using a separate combustor for turbine gas (e.g. RS-68), 2) the 
“expander cycle” using heat from nozzle cooling to expand the cryogenic propellant and drive the turbine (e.g. RL- 
lo), and 3 )  the staged combustion cycle using the exhaust from turbine drive gas pre-burner(s) to fuel the main 
combustion chamber (e.g. SSME). Cycle selection involves consideration of complexity, controllability, and 
operating stress, pressure and temperature, which can affect the achieved reliability as well as the ease of engine 
development. Simplicity, based on few components and an uncomplicated schematic does not always lead to high 
reliability. A specific engine cycle and its detailed designs have to be evaluated for reliability impact, and unique 
design and reliability challenges have to be addressed. 
Vehicle and enpine interface and interaction hazards -- Vehicle and engine interface design is one of the key 
reliability drivers. Many interface and interaction related failure modes and hazards are of concern such as 
contamination passing from the vehicle to the engine or vice-versa, electromagnetic interference (emi), power 
supply failure, and propellant feedline blockage. A multiple engine system may also have possible common cause 
failures that lead to multiple engine shutdowns, which can result in a catastrophe. From design-for-reliability 
perspective, a robust vehicle boat tail design that can tolerate a sudden engine propellant leakage and/or shrapnel 
due to an engine failure will greatly improve vehicle system reliability and redefine the criticality of many engine 
failure modes and hazards. 
Enpine health management system -- We refer to the engine health management system as a basic engine redline 
system as well as advanced sensors and algorithms that include multiple engine parameters that infer an engine 
anomaly condition from sensor data and take nutigation action accordingly. Basic redlines are straightforward in 
that they usually act on a single operating parameter anomaly, such as a turbine discharge temperature higher than a 
pre-predicted nominal value approaching a material property limit. The SSME basic redline system currently has 
four in-flight redlines with five monitoring parameters. SSME Advanced Health Management System (AHMS) 
Phase I effort is to implement a high pressure turbopump vibration monitor that acts on a detected turbopump 
abnormal synchronized vibration signature and shuts down the engine safely when the redline is exceeded. SSME 
AHMS Phase 11, as it was originally proposed several years ago, was to introduce a linear engine model, an optical 
plume anomaly detection (OPAD) and advanced vibration monitor system. The AHMS I1 type of systems promises 
not only to eliminate some catastrophic failures but also to mitigate benign shutdowns to non-shutdown actions such 
as throttle down or propellant mixture ratio adjustment as well as to reduce unnecessary shutdowns based on smart 
algorithms, therefore improving total engine reliability and mission success probability. For the general reliability 
discussion purpose, we define HMS implementation as three levels: basic redlines, HMS level I with enhanced 
redlines, and HMS level with advanced sensors and algorithms inferring kom multiple engine parameters. Our 
parametric reliability model will address the reliability impact of these three levels of HMS implementation. 
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Engine modification -- It is often more appealing to modify existing engines for new applications than developing a 
new engine. It can save cost and reduce development and certification time significantly. But it is not risk free, 
especially for an upgrade that demands a higher capability, such as the cases of upgrading a non-reusable engine to 
reusable one, fixed thrust to a variable thrust, and thrust size increase. Even without capability upgrading, 
modification of an existing engine encounters risks of changing original design characteristics of the engine, and 
introducing new failure modes, causes and hazards. All potential risks have to be carefdly evaluated and addressed 
for an engine modification activity. 
Engine ground start hold-down ‘with launch commit criteria (LCC) -- The SSME has about 6 seconds start 
phase hold down during a launch event. During that period, the engine starts, valves open and the power level 
ramps up while the engine is still on the ground. The engine controller and health management system checks and 
monitors numerous engine parameters to make sure the engine runs nominally and within expected conditions 
compared to the pre-established launch commit criteria. If the controller and HMS detect any malfunction, the 
engine will shutdown and the mission will be aborted. Most ground-start engine applications have this ground hold 
down period. It is designed to enhance in-flight reliability in several ways: 1). making sure engine is conditioned 
properly to proceed into main stage operation and to be off ground; 2). verifying all in-flight instrumentations 
perform nominally, and 3). screening for start transient phase failure modes and hazards, possible infant mortality 
failures from post acceptance test or flight inspections and check-outs, and residual risks camed from the last 
operation. Although historical data have indicated some mission aborts due to violation of LCC’s had been 
unnecessary due to the conservatism of the LCC, the hold down period is a significant factor for flight reliability. 
Without the hold down period, engine flight reliability will be reduced. This is the case for altitude start engine 
application we discuss next. 
Altitude Start  (lst start) -- A multiple stage propulsion vehicle usually requires its upper stage engines to start at 
altitude. There are reliability pros and cons comparing altitude start vs. ground start. Example of pros is that for 
hydrogen engine, altitude start will not be concerned with a fire due to a hydrogen leak because of the vacuum 
environment. But overall, the cons outweigh the pros, mainly because altitude start engine will not have as 
effective launch commit check as a ground start with hold down period. Additionally, it is not easy for development 
tests to simulate and address in-flight altitude start failures. Some failures that may occur during the start phase will 
not be protected by LCC and start redlines. Some failures that may occur during main stage but would have been 
detected by the start LCC’s will not be prevented. Propellant conditioning may also be a challenging design issue. 
We have introduced an altitude start penalty factor for reliability calculation for an engine that can be used for both 
booster and upper stage applications. 
Multiple altitude Start (> 1” start) -- Much of the discussion of 1’‘ altitude start is applicable for an upper stage 
engine that is required to start a 2”d or 3rd time. A multiple start (>2) engine application is like a reusable engine 
application but without the between-flight check-out and maintenance. Additional risks for 2”d or 3rd start include the 
residual risk from the first start that could have been prevented through ground pre-flight checkout and maintenance, 
and engine conditioning (drying, purge, bleed, chill down, inlet condition, etc.). 
Component, subsystem and system design -- Many root causes of engine failures can be attributed to component, 
subsystem and system design. We fully recognize the importance of design-for-reliability starting in the early phases 
of design activities to address failure mode elimination and cause prevention and mitigation. The subject of design- 
for-reliability for identified failure modes and causes will be discussed in much more detail in future articles. Our 
parametric reliability model will use a top level set of reliability drivers and assume some reliability parameter 
values to conduct sensitivity analysis. The input parameter values of the model can be varied to accommodate 
different design-for-reliability strategies and potential reliability improvement results. 
Manufacturing/ground operation supuort/Pre and post flight check outs and inspection -- Manufacturing 
robustness, inspectability, pre and post flight check outs, maintenance activities all have significant effects on engine 
reliability. Human errors are often embedded in all these activities proportional to the opportunities of human 
being’s involvement in the product and processes. 
Extensiveness of development program - An engine development program is a key factor in the determination of 
flight engine reliability. Subscale, component and subsystem development and testing, lab and hot fire testing, 
certification programs, design verification, reliability verification and demonstration, failure analysis and corrective 
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actions, and redesigns are important elements of a development program to uncover issues and verify design 
process fixes. Reliability growth, through a development program, and residual risk inherited from 
development program, significantly impact the flight reliability. 
and 
the 
Figure 1 presents an object oriented view of all engine reliability drivers and associations among them. 
Figure 1. Engine Reliability Drivers and Their Inter-relationships 
Start hold down 
111. A Reliability Model 
In this section, we will build the reliability model. 
sensitivity results using the model for some reliability parameter values. 
We define an engine failure as an engine induced anomaly event that causes the engine not to meet its mission 
objective. We define an engine system failure for a multiple engine cluster propulsion stage as an engine anomaly 
that causes a mission failure. We also define the consequence of the failure in two categories: contained failures or 
uncontained failures. Contained failures are those that the failed engine is forced to be shutdown by health 
management system and the consequence of the failure is contained within the engine and no other vehicle elements 
are alkcted. We also call it as benign failures or benign shutdonn. Uncontained failures are those that result in an 
instantaneous catastrophic failure of the engine and affect other vehicle elements in a detrimental manner. Examples 
of engine catastrophic failures are engine fire, explosion, massive and rapid propellant dump on other vehicle 
elements such as aft compartment, and engine shrapnel hitting adjacent engines or other vehicle components. By 
definition, a catastrophic engine failure results in loss of vehicle. 
in the previous section. 
stage, and Rs,, as engine cluster system reliability. We have 
Equation (1) is a simple equation and needs to be evolved and be more specific for our applications. As we have 
discussed in Section 11, the total engine reliability consists of 4 parts of the failure considerations, catastrophic 
fraction part, denoted as C,; preventable failure fraction, denoted as Pf; survivable failure fraction, denoted as Sf; and 
erroneous failure fraction, denoted as Ef. The concept of decomposing all engine failures into these four failure 
fractions and addressing each of them individually according to their failure natures is one of the key and unique 
Then in next section, we will derive some reliability 
We start from a simple model then expand the model by introducing more reliability driver parameters discussed 
We denote RT as single engine total reliability, N as number of engines in the cluster that powers the propulsion 
Rs.1 = RT" (1) 
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reliability design features for liquid propulsion engines. These four fractions are directly relevant to an engine with 
health management system (HMS) in place. The four fractions add up to 100%. Root causes of Cf, Pf and Sfare due 
to engine hardware component failures and Ef is due to health management system errors or control system software 
errors. Figure 2 depicts the concept. 
Figure 2. Total Engine Failurn Pmbabw 
HMS instrumentation failures 
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Faiiwes (P’ 
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We apply Eq. (1) to an engine system with basic redlines active as the HMS implementation. After decomposing 
total failures into four parts, we have 
RS,J = (1 - Cr (I - 
RS.3 = (I - C, (1 - RT))N (1 - P, (1 - R,))N 
Rs.4~ 1 - [ NC, (1 - R, ) + NPj (I - R,  )] 
(1 - Pr (1 - RT))N (1 - S ,  (1 - (1 - E, (1 - (2) 
Considering the situation that redline system is deactivated, so we don’t concern failure portions of Sfand Ef, for the 
reason that S f ,  by failure nature, is survivable without redlines, and Ef is originated from HMS instrumentation 
induced erroneous shutdowns. So for the engine system without redlines active, we have 
(3) 
(4) 
With RT sufficiently close to 1 (>.99), Eq.(3) can be approximated by 
Comparing (2) with (3), one would draw a counter-intuitive conclusion that an engine system with redline system 
active is less reliable than the one without the redline system. Something must be missing. The missing part is 
engine-out design concept and its reliability implication. One of the essential reasons to implement a redline system, 
for multiple engine system, is to design the engine system with engine-out capability as we have described in 
Section 11. This will improve the system reliability. Now we evolve our reliability formulas based on one engine-out 
capability for an engine system aith ?I (’1) cngines in the c!uster. For this c s e ,  the cngine system fails only when 
any of N engines fails catastrophically or 2 or more engines benign shutdown. Therefore, we have system reliability 
as follows 
( 5 )  Rs.5 = (1 - C, (1 - R, ) )N  [(I - (1 - Cf)(l - R T ) ) N  + N(1-  (1 - C,)Q - RT )) N - l  (1 - C,)(1 - R, ))] 
With RT sufficiently close to 1 (>.99), Eq.(5) can be approximated by 
N ( N  -1) 
2 
R s . 6 ~  l - [ N C f ( l - R , ) +  ( (1  - CJ1 - R, )I2 (1 - (1 - c/ )(I - R, 1 (6) 
Substituting Cf with 1 - Pf- Sf - Ef, we get 
Finally, we introduce HMS level I effect factor, HMS level I1 effect factor, engine operation run time factor, and 
power level &-rating factor into our model. We denote Hlcf as the factor for HMS I effect on catastrophic portion 
of the failure, and H,Pf as the factor for HMS I effect on preventable portion of the failure, and so on. We denote tpct 
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as percentage of engine operation run time as certified run duration time and different failure rate adjustment Beta 
factors Pcf, p,f, psf, and Pef, for Cf, Pf, Sf and Ef portions of the failures respectively. We denote Dcf, Dpf, Dsf and DEf 
as power level de-rating factors on Cf, Pf, Sf and Efportions of the failures respectively We introduce all these 
factors into Eq. (4) that is applicable for without-engine-out design, and on Eq. (7) for with-engine-out design, we 
get 
We have derived Eq.(8) and Eq.(9) as closed form formulas. These are approximations in that some higher order 
reliability effects are ignored, such as the case that more than two engines fail, or dynamic changing of the failure 
rate when engine out occurs and the rest of the engines have to power up and operate at a thrust level that exhibits a 
higher failure rate. Ref. 3 has discussed a dynamic changing failure rate model. Our analytical results have 
indicated Eq. (8) and (9) are good approximations and well suited for reliability trades study and sensitivity analysis 
of current space launch vehicle conceptual design and system architecture definition. The reliability model we 
established in this section explicitly and parametrically addresses about half of the more than 20 reliability drivers 
we discussed in Section 11. We will continuously expand the model to include more reliability drivers as application 
needs arise and relevant data become available. 
IV. Reliability Sensitivity Results 
In this section, we will present some trades study and sensitivity analysis results for several application cases, 
using Eq.( 8) for calculating reliability of without-engine-out design and Eq. (9) for with-engine-out design. 
Case 1. Engine system reliability as frtnction of catastrophic fraction (C’ 
In this case study, we examine the effect of Cf on the engine cluster system reliability with one engine-out design. 
We assume single engine total reliability RT = .999, basic redline system, no de-rating and certified duration. SO we 
reduce all H values (HMS effect drivers), D values (de-rating effect) and tpct values (engine run time variation) to 1. 
Figure 3 shows some sensitivity curves. 
by half. This conclusion is pretty generic even input parameter values vary within a reasonable application range. 
A result is obvious in that doubling the Cf will reduce the system MTBF 
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Figure 3. Engine S&stei:ta Reliability as Fuection of Catastrophic Fraction 
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Case 2. With-engine-out vs. Without-engine-out trades 
In this case study, we examine the reliability sensitivity and trades between with-engine-out (WEO) design and 
without-engine-out (WOEO) design. We calculate the engine cluster system reliability for N=3, 4, and 5 of WE0 
and for N=l,2,4 of WOEO. Again, we assume single engine total reliability RT = .999, basic redline system, no de- 
rating and certified duration like in Case l .  Figure 4 shows the sensitivity results with many trades facts. If we look 
at the particular curve on the graph with WE0 design and N=3, and compare with the horizontal line with WOEO 
design and N=l and Sf+E,-lO%, we see they intersect at about (2~30%.  This indicates as long as CfL: 30%, the 
WE0 design will have a better system reliability than the WOEO design. We can construct and interpret other 
curves from our reliability model for any particular application scenarios similarly. 
Figure 4. With-Eiigine-Out (WEO) and WItbout-Engine-Out (WOEO) Trades 
W E 0  is one engine out capability 
(assume single engine reliability = .9W) 
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Case 3. Additional design margin gained by W E 0  design 
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We continue to pursue the effect of with-engine-out design. This case study presents another view of the benefit of 
WE0 that is an additional design margin gained through engine-out design. Figure 5 illustrates such scenario. This 
additional reliability margin is precious for it will help to achieve stringent reliability requirements of current space 
exploration launch vehicles and may possibly expand trades space among reliability and other design parameters for 
an optimal vehicle design. 
Figure 5. With-Engine-Out Design Provides Additional Design Margin 
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Case 4. Health Management System (HMS) effect 
We have assumed a HMS basic redline system in several case studies discussed above for WE0 design. We also 
discussed HMS implementation levels and their effects on engine reliability in Section I1 Reliability Drivers. Figure 
6 further illustrates the HMS impact on different portions of the reliability. In summary, we can state that basic 
redline systems and HMS I will mitigate certain catastrophic failures to benign shutdowns but possibly increases the 
portion of survivable and erroneous shutdown fractions, and HMS I1 potentially improves all potions of reliability. 
We now introduce HMS effect on the scenario of Case 3. We assume HMS I mitigates 10% catastrophic failures 
and convert these failures to benign shutdowns, and does not change survivable and erroneous fractions. We also 
assume HMS 11 hrther reduces the failure probability by 5% across the board. Figure 7 shows the potential 
additional benefit brought by HMS. 
Figure6. HkIS Impact 
120% 
Basic redlines + HMS level I + HMS level I1 
C, - Catastrophic (uncontained) failure fractions 
P, - Fraction of failures that would have been catastrophic but prevented by HMS 
S, - Fraction of failures that would have survived but was unnecessarily shutdown by HMS 
E,- Fraction of failures that are caused by HMS instrumentation failures (erroneous shutdown) 
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Figure 7. Additional BeneP? by HMS 
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Case 5. De-rating effect and engine run duration adjustment 
We have briefly 
discussed the de-rating concept in the Reliability Driver section. In summary, de-rating is not only beneficial to 
improve reliability but also a necessary design consideration to accommodate engine-out total thrust need. Liquid 
engine industry has examined de-rating possibility in the past and has derived various de-rating curves. An 
alternative design solution is to extend the remaining engine operation time at the same power level when one or 
more engines are out. This relates to the reliability calculation for varied engine running duration applications. We 
have studied relationship of failure rate vs. engine run time and established some failure rate changing functions for 
various launch vehicle reliability studies. Here we present an illustrative example that shows the trades between 
power level de-rating and run time adjustment. 
A with-engine-out design usually is accompanied by the engine power level de-rating. 
Figure 8 Engine Power Level De- 
rating and RM time Trades 
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V. Summary and Conclusion 
We have established a comprehensive set of liquid engine reliability drivers and developed a reliability model to 
address parametrically some of them. We have illustrated some application examples of the model and reliability 
sensitivities for some ofthe reliability parameters. The results shown in the examples are pretty generic though the 
data and scenarios are not specific to any on-going space exploration vehicle studies. We are using the reliability 
model to support Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle architecture design and system trades study. 
Through the discussion of the reliability drivers and sensitivity analysis examples, we recognized four fractions 
of engine reliability. Those are catastrophic fraction (Cf), preventable failure fraction (Pf), survivable failure fraction 
(Sf) and erroneous shutdown fraction (E'). Every of these fractions has unique root causes and different 
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consequences on vehicle, and has to be addressed with different design-for-reliability strategy and approaches while 
attentions have to be paid on interaction, inter-relationships and integration of them. Assisting the system design 
optimization, we introduced engine out design concept, health management system implementation, de-rating, and 
engine run time adjustment factor. We incorporate all these parameters into our reliability model and make it a 
powerful tool to support our nation’s new space exploration activities. 
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